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Abstract
Understanding other people’s feelings and perspectives is an important part of effective 
social communication and interaction. Empathy is the phenomenon that enables us to 
infer the feelings of others and understand their mental states. It aids in social learning 
and bonding and is thought to be impaired in individuals with social deficits like schizo-
phrenia and autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Advances in neuroimaging technology 
have allowed social neuroscientists to study brain activity during this complex social 
process. A growing body of empathy literature demonstrates that multiple brain regions 
are involved in empathy. Current theories propose that empathy is enabled through 
the activation of various dynamic neural networks, each made up of several different 
regions. These networks respond differently depending on specific contexts and avail-
able information. This chapter reviews the networks involved in empathy and highlights 
the current theories and limitations of empathy research.
Keywords: empathy, functional magnetic resonance imaging, mentalizing, mirror neuron 
system, pain matrix
1. Introduction
Empathy is a complex social phenomenon that broadly refers to the ability to understand 
and share the feelings of another person. Unlike sympathy, which only requires someone to 
understand another person’s feelings on an intellectual level, empathy is unique in that it is 
also thought to involve knowing someone’s feelings by connecting with those same feelings 
in one’s self. In other words, empathy means having a first-person understanding or emo-
tional response to someone else’s experience. This shared understanding can occur in various 
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ways by employing different emotional and cognitive mechanisms such as affect sharing, 
simulation, imagination, and theory of mind [1]. Researchers categorize subtypes of empathy 
as cognitive empathy or emotional empathy. Cognitive empathy refers to perspective taking, 
while emotional or affective empathy refers to shared emotions and feelings. It is thought 
that the capacity to empathize requires the activation of different neural networks depending 
on the type of empathy evoked. Despite the rapid growth in empathy research since Robert 
Vischer’s first English translation of the word, einfühlung, meaning “in-feeling” or “feeling-
into,” over 150 years ago [2], there are still many questions that remain regarding the neuro-
science of the phenomenon.
Social and behavioral psychologists have conducted the majority of empathy research in the 
last few decades [3]. With the advent of modern neuroimaging techniques, researchers now 
have the ability to study the neural processes involved in empathy and how different factors 
such as individual traits, situational context, and even personal experience modulate related 
neural network activity. State-of-the-art neuroimaging methods and techniques such as func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allow scientists to investigate how these networks 
activate when sharing the feelings of another person in controlled experimental environ-
ments. Functional MRI studies typically measure blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) 
changes that occur as a result of precisely timed experimental designs that elicit empathy in 
participants. These designs allow scientists to compare BOLD responses during different sub-
types of empathy and compare them to control conditions that do not require empathy. A link 
between empathy and brain regions is most often found by statistically correlating the BOLD 
response evoked in an empathy task with individual differences in empathy traits as mea-
sured by questionnaires. The present chapter highlights current neuroimaging research on 
neural networks thought to enable empathy and the attributes that modulate network activa-
tion. Specifically, this chapter will cover prevailing theories of empathy, how it is generated, 
i.e., through “shared” or “mirroring” networks, and the limitations of current study designs.
2. “Shared” brain networks of empathy
The first question to ask when investigating the neuroscience of empathy is “What parts of the 
brain are active when people are acting empathically or feeling empathy?” Core brain regions 
thought to underlie empathy include regions within the “pain matrix,” namely the anterior 
insula (AI) and the middle anterior cingulate cortex (mACC) [4–6]. In numerous fMRI stud-
ies, these core regions respond both when experiencing first-hand as well as when observ-
ing in others an emotional response or feeling (mostly conducted with the feeling of pain 
[7, 8]). Therefore, it is thought that we understand the emotions and perspectives of others 
by utilizing and processing in brain regions that are active both when we ourselves have a 
sensory, affective, or bodily experience, and when someone else has a similar experience [9]. 
This theory has become known as the “Shared Network Hypothesis” [10]. For this reason, the 
AI and mACC, as well as other brain areas that have similar properties, are often referred to 
as “shared” or sometimes “mirroring” brain regions. Indeed, the activation of many shared 
brain networks, such as the mirror neuron system (MNS) as well as the pain matrix and some 
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emotion-related brain regions, has been linked either directly or indirectly to the genesis of 
empathy. These shared networks have repeatedly been proposed to underlie the mechanisms 
that allow people to mentally “share” the feelings of another. The sections below discuss pre-
vious and current research related to empathy across these networks.
2.1. Empathy and mirror neuron system (MNS)
Neurons in motor regions of the brain that respond both to action execution and action obser-
vation are called mirror neurons. Mirror neurons were first discovered in macaque monkey’s 
F5 premotor region in the 1990s when scientists noticed the same neuron responded not only 
when the monkey was performing an action but also when he observing another person per-
forming a similar action (e.g., cracking a peanut or watching someone else crack a peanut). In 
humans, the mirror neuron system (MNS), first proposed by Gallese et al. [11], is a network 
of brain areas that respond similarly (see Figure 1) [11]. It is composed of the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG; thought to be homologous to F5 area in the macaque monkey), in addition to sen-
sorimotor regions (i.e., the lower part of the precentral gyrus, the rostral part of the inferior 
parietal lobule). Many models of the MNS suggest that mirror neurons provide a mechanism 
for automatically translating the actions of others onto our own motor system. In other words, 
Figure 1. Human mirror neuron on system (MNS). Lateral view of brain with frontal (ventral pre-motor and IFG) and 
parietal (rostral IPL) labels of the mirror neuron system in addition to the superior temporal sulcus. IFG = inferior frontal 
gyrus; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; STS = superior temporal sulcus.
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whenever one perceives an action of another person, we automatically and covertly “mirror” 
those actions onto our motor system. Thus, we might understand other people’s actions and 
intentions by covertly simulating them in our motor regions as if we were performing the 
action ourselves. This form of putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes and taking their per-
spective is thought to be an important component of cognitive empathy [12]. Indeed, several 
studies have related empathic traits to neural activity in the MNS, indicating that individu-
als who have higher activity in the MNS also score higher on cognitive aspects of empathy 
[13–18]. Thus, the MNS may be one neural network involved in perspective taking and cogni-
tive aspects of empathy.
2.2. Empathy and the pain matrix
Other neural networks are thought to process emotional aspects of empathy. One network 
that has been indicated to be involved in empathizing with pain experienced by others is 
called the pain matrix. The pain matrix includes the insula, anterior and middle cingulate 
gyrus, and somatosensory cortices (SI and SII) [6, 19–21]. Interestingly, like the MNS, the pain 
matrix is activated both when one experiences pain oneself and when observing another per-
son experiencing pain. In a seminal paper in this area, researchers found significant activity in 
the pain matrix both when a participant in an MRI scanner experienced pain as well as when 
someone close to them was experiencing pain (Figure 2) [6]. Because this network responds 
so strongly to both physical pain and to processing the pain of others, the AI and mACC are 
thought to be involved in processing affective components of empathy [6, 8, 22]. The activa-
tion of the core regions of the pain matrix for processing self and others’ pain is consistent 
across numerous studies implementing a variety of experimental paradigms, suggesting that 
pain mirroring, and perhaps empathy itself, can be investigated with high reliability by social 
neuroscience [8].
However, some critics have proposed that shared representations for self and other in the 
pain matrix might not be related to empathy, but instead merely reflect an evolutionary 
response carried out to prepare a motor response as a self-protection mechanism when a 
threat is detected [23]. For example, watching someone grimace in pain from stepping on a 
nail may activate our pain and sensorimotor network to prepare the actions needed to avoid 
experiencing pain ourselves (i.e., stepping away from the nail). Furthermore, while there is 
a consensus regarding the core regions in the brain that process pain, there are discrepan-
cies on when and how input from the pain matrix is linked to empathy. Disparate results 
in pain research, such as the engagement of primary and secondary somatosensory cortices 
during the observation of pain [6], suggest that the pain matrix as a whole may not respond 
to all types of pain and that it depends on the contextual environments (see sections below 
for more detail). The same is true for the recruitment of the MNS during cognitive empathy. 
One common explanation for aberrant findings in empathy research is that there are distinct 
networks or routes for different types of empathy. Many research groups are using new imag-
ing paradigms and methodologies to explore this dynamic network theory. More research is 
needed to better understand how the different circuits involved during pain empathy interact 
and modulation by context.
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2.3. Mentalizing network and cognitive empathy
Mentalizing is a term sometimes used interchangeably with theory of mind (ToM), both 
typically refer to the cognitive processes involved in understanding the intentions, desires, 
or beliefs of another person. The “mentalizing network” involves brain regions that have 
been shown to be activated when someone thinks about another person’s mental states. They 
include the precuneus, ventral parts of medial prefrontal cortex, posterior superior temporal 
cortex, temporal parietal junction (TPJ), and the temporal poles [24–26]. For example, this net-
work is active when participants are asked to think about the intentions of another person’s 
emotions or actions. Some researchers restrict the definition of mentalizing to only cognitive 
perspectives when the observer is consciously mentalizing about someone’s mental state [27]; 
Figure 2. Shared network for self and others’ pain. Modified figure from Singer et al. [6]. (a) and (b) illustrate location of 
increased BOLD signal in brain regions that were significantly active for pain over no pain in both the self and others’ 
conditions as reported by Singer et al. Regions of increased activation to pain in both self and others’ conditions included 
the ACC, cerebellum, brainstem/dorsal pons, left insula, and right anterior insula. (c) Graphs representing the time 
courses extracted from areas of peak activation in the ACC and right insula for pain greater than no pain in both the self 
(gray) and other (black) conditions. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex.
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however, others include the immediate, automatic, and covert cognitive inference about other 
people’s emotional states [28]. Neuroimaging studies on ToM often do not make this dis-
tinction and typically ask participants to consciously mentalize. However, some neuroimag-
ing research distinguishes between cognitive and affective aspects of ToM. Cognitive ToM is 
required to understand what someone else may be thinking and affective ToM is required to 
understand how someone might feel given a specific situation. While cognitive and affective 
components of ToM may be necessary for a fully functioning ToM, individual regions have 
been shown to play prominent roles in either cognitive (ventral medial prefrontal cortex) or 
affective (ventral medial frontal lobe) perspective taking [29].
2.4. Emotion-related brain regions and affective empathy
Affective empathy is thought to elicit emotion-related brain regions that are involved in the 
processing of feelings and emotions. Emotion-related brain regions commonly include the 
hypothalamus, hippocampus, amygdala, insula, and the cingulate, as well the ventral and 
medial sectors of the prefrontal cortices [30]. Activity in the insula and amygdala are com-
monly known to be involved in affective processing and are thought to be related to affective 
aspects of empathy along with regions of the MNS (i.e., IFG) [31–33]. In particular, the ante-
rior insula, by processing information from the viscera that arise when emotions occur, may 
be necessary for interpreting body states as affective feelings [34]. Notably, Antonio Damasio 
et al. have argued that changes in body states and homeostasis (i.e., emotions) are felt as feel-
ings through the representation of these emotions in the brain [35]. So when you feel nervous, 
this may be because your brain (anterior insula along with other brain areas such as regions 
of the brainstem) has noticed a quickening in your heartbeat, a clenching in your gut, sweat 
being produced, and has interpreted that change in body state as nervousness [34]. Damasio 
has also posited that a physical stimulus is not necessary to experience feelings and that they 
can be simulated in brain maps when you are empathizing [36]. Indeed, more recent research 
has been suggested that the insula is involved in integrating subjective feelings, uncertainty, 
and empathy [10, 37].
2.5. Interactions between different neural networks
Recent models of empathy propose that our capacity to understand the affective and cog-
nitive states of others is enabled by different mechanisms or “routes” [9, 38, 39]. Broadly, 
one route is through the simulating or mirroring networks (e.g., MNS, pain matrix), and the 
other, the ToM/mentalizing networks (see Figure 3). Simultaneous core emotion-related brain 
regions (ACC and AI) and MNS brain regions are thought to be elicited when empathy is trig-
gered in response to various sensory stimuli such as viewing body parts in pain or hearing 
action sounds [3, 13, 40]. During conscious intention understanding of others, as well as self-
referential thought, it is thought that a second route for empathy is elicited through the theory 
of mind or “mentalizing” brain regions. Processing in this network enables sharing other’s 
states based upon one’s previous experiences and knowledge (see Ref. [41] for review), and it 
might be particularly important in situations in which externally provided sensory informa-
tion about the other’s mental state is lacking. For example, the mentalizing network might be 
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utilized when you listen to lyrics in a pop-song and empathize with the song writer’s expe-
rience, or when viewing a painting or photo without knowing the events that led up to the 
event being captured and empathize with the artist or the subject matter.
A similar pattern of dynamic interaction has been proposed for empathic responses in the 
pain matrix. It is thought that sensory-discriminative attributes (i.e., location, quality, and 
intensity) and autonomic-affective attributes (i.e., perceived unpleasantness) of a painful 
experience are coded differently in the network. Singer’s research group demonstrated that 
only self-pain activated contralateral SI, SII/posterior insula, and caudal ACC, while rostral 
ACC and AI activation enables both self and others’ pain. The authors suggest that eliciting 
different networks for self and others’ representations contributes to the better understand-
ing of the subjective feelings. However, contradicting evidence from more recent studies has 
demonstrated that somatosensory (SI/SII) regions are engaged during both self and others’ 
processing [21, 43]. These disparate findings may be due to the variations in stimulus repre-
sentation methodology, which again can trigger different neural routes. Viewing body parts 
in pain, for example, tends to elicit somatosensory regions compared to more abstract pain 
cues where body parts are not shown [8, 44]. A study that compares both bodily and psycho-
logical pain may help detangle and test a multi-route theory.
Empathetic routes are found to exist at even the smallest levels of distinction. There is evi-
dence of distinct empathic routes that are sensitive to emotions at the level of valence. Since 
pain elicits a robust response in the brain, empathy research has been skewed to favor pain 
Figure 3. Empathy network. A modified illustration of Dvash and Shamay-Tsoory [42] model of two main systems for 
empathy, cognitive empathy, and emotional empathy. In addition to Dvash and Shamy-Tsorry’s theory of mind (ToM) 
distinction between cognitive ToM (taking the cognitive perspective of another) and affective ToM (building a theory 
over what another person feels), a distinction between two types of simulation/mirroring processes is presented. Affective 
empathy, via regions in the pain matrix/emotional brain regions, refers to the simulation of another’s feelings and 
emotions in oneself is distinguished from cognitive empathy, via regions in the Mirror Neuron System that refers to the 
simulation of another person’s actions. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; IFG= Inferior Frontal Gyrus; IPL= inferior parietal 
lobule; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; STS = superior temporal sulcus; ToM = theory of mind; TP = temporal parietal; 
vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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and negative emotions. It is less known how empathy varies across different emotions in 
general, and how it is linked to valence (positive or negative feelings). One fMRI study by the 
Singer group [45] compared pleasant and unpleasant touch in attempts to understand mecha-
nisms for empathy between different valenced emotions. The group found distinct neural 
pathways for positive and negative valence that were involved in processing empathy. The 
first-hand and vicarious experience of pleasant touch (e.g., a flower) commonly recruited the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), while unpleasant stimulation (e.g., rubber maggots) led 
to shared activation in the right fronto-insular cortex. These findings suggest that different 
subsystems are engaged when one is mentally sharing positive compared to negative sensa-
tions of others. Taken together, these observations indicate that empathy is a dynamic process 
that elicits multiple subnetworks. Ultimately, further exploration of different emotions in dif-
ferent contexts will bring us closer to understanding the nuances of how empathy is elicited 
and the subsequent role it plays in influencing one’s experience of the mental and emotional 
states of others. It will also contribute to our understanding of clinical disorders that are char-
acterized by deficits in social processing, such as psychopathy and ASD.
3. Individual differences and empathy in shared brain networks
As discussed above, substantial evidence supports (at least in part) the shared network theory 
of empathy. However, it is less clear how individual’s traits and past experiences modulate 
these systems. While empathic neural responses often occur automatically, they can also be 
modulated tremendously by various individual and situational factors [9, 39, 46–49]. Previous 
experience with particular actions as well as contextual factors, such as the other belonging 
to an ingroup or outgroup, can influence network activity as well as which subnetworks are 
invoked. The sections below discuss experience and individual differences related to empa-
thy in the MNS and pain matrix.
3.1. The mirror neuron system
To understand how individual differences relate to neural activity in the MNS, scientists com-
pare brain responses to different actions or changes to the context of an action to individual 
differences in traits and behavior. For example, one approach has been to try to understand 
how familiarity with actions modulates MNS activation and empathic processing. One com-
mon paradigm is to compare neural activity when observing a familiar action to that of a 
novel action and correlate the neural activity for each action type to individual differences 
in trait measures of empathy. Empirical evidence from these studies suggests that while the 
MNS is engaged for both types of actions (familiar and novel), BOLD signal increases when 
watching visually or physically familiar actions compared to unfamiliar actions [12, 50–58]. 
These studies support the general premise of a “like me” hypothesis of action observation 
function. The “like-me” hypothesis states that we engage with actions that are in our own 
motor repertoire, or more visually familiar, the more the MNS is engaged [56]. This has led 
some to propose that experience-driven simulation mechanisms modulate the MNS [54].
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On the other hand, some research demonstrates that MNS activity increases when observing 
novel actions such as a robot dancing [59] or those who are less similar to one’s self (e.g., some-
one with a different cultural or racial background) [60]. Furthermore, one study found that 
observing a novel limb (the residual limb of an amputee) elicited more activity than observ-
ing a typical hand action. However, this effect was modulated by experience with residual 
limbs [57]. In addition, in that study, it was found that the more empathic participants were, 
the more they engage their parietal motor regions when viewing the novel limb, but that this 
correlation was not significant once they were familiarized with the novel limb. This study 
underscores the notion that regions of the MNS are modulated by familiarity, experience, and 
individual differences in empathy traits.
3.2. The pain matrix
Various individual and contextual factors modulate the pain matrix as well. Social context 
such as group bias has been studied in the pain matrix, and similar relationships between 
BOLD signals in pain-related brain regions and empathy have been found. Relationship 
dynamics between observer and observee, such as social status or group membership, has 
been reported to modulate the BOLD signal in regions of the pain matrix while observing 
pain in others [8–10, 22]. For example, a recent study investigating social status and empathy 
for pain found that activity in the pain matrix is biased toward self-perceived inferior-status 
individuals compared with superior-status individuals. When painful stimulation (needle 
from a syringe penetrating cheek) was applied to inferior-status targets, higher activation in 
empathy-related brain regions (AI and aMCC) was observed, whereas activity in these same 
regions was attenuated when observing painful stimulation applied to superior-status targets 
(Figure 4).
In another study, the pain matrix was found to activate more when pain is inflicted on some-
one from an individual’s in-group than out-group [22]. Specifically, activity in the ACC and 
the insula was found to be greater when participants view pained expressions on the faces 
of a racial in-group member, while receiving injections to the cheek compared to activity 
when viewing out-group members. These findings suggest that group biases can modulate 
empathy and sensitivity in pain-related emotions [22]. In concordance with previous studies, 
Xu et al. [22] found that empathic activity is a function of individual differences. Participants 
who showed greater empathic neural responses to in-group members also showed stronger 
empathic neural responses to out-group members, highlighting the significance of individual 
differences empathy-related activity [22].
While several of the studies mentioned above found a relationship between activity levels in 
the pain matrix and empathy traits, it is unclear if activity levels reflect the depth of pain pro-
cessing rather than empathic processing per se. For example, in a study by Fox et al. [62], it was 
found that there was more activity in the pain matrix when viewing disliked others rather than 
liked others. In this study, Jewish participants showed more activity in components of the pain 
matrix when they viewed neo-nazis in pain than when viewing neutral likable individuals in 
pain [62]. Given that the participants did not report feeling more empathy for the neo-nazis 
than the likable individuals, the authors of that study suggested that perhaps activity levels 
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in the pain matrix do not correspond to the degree of empathy one feels, but instead depth of 
processing. The authors argue in their study that it was more relevant for the Jewish partici-
pants to processes the pain level of their enemy (a neo-nazi) than that of a neutral individual, 
which was reflected in the increased activity the pain matrix. Thus, it might be that while activ-
ity in the pain matrix may contribute to empathic processing, it is not sufficient for empathic 
processing on its own.
4. Empathy research limitations
As discussed above, many questions about how, where, and when empathy is generated in the 
brain remain. Moving forward there are several challenges scientists have to overcome before 
arriving at a more complete understanding of this dynamic process. Some limitations are the 
result of neuroimaging techniques. It is difficult to study a complex social phenomenon such as 
empathy in the sterile, cold, and noisy environment of an MRI. Until a more ecologically valid 
way of measuring neural activity is found, it is important to keep in mind that findings in the 
lab may not be generalizable to real, everyday life. Study design, data analysis, and individual 
differences in samples are also important to consider. The discrepant findings we have exam-
ined in this chapter may, in part, be accounted for by differences in these areas. For instance, 
Figure 4. Anterior insula activity and pain. Modified figure from Feng et al. [61]. (a) Representation of the region of 
interest in the left and right anterior insula used by Feng et al. (b) Graph of mean BOLD signal extracted from the left 
anterior insula (L, AI) and right anterior insula (R, AI) during pain and nonpain for superior and inferior conditions 
(error bars indicate one standard error). (c) Graph representing the correlation between TAS-20 scores and empathic 
responses of the left anterior insula in response to inferior targets during pain compared to no pain.
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using on measures of empathy that rely on subjective, self-reports could be problematic. One of 
the most commonly used empathy measure is a questionnaire called the interpersonal reactiv-
ity index (IRI; [1]). Several studies have found that the higher the participant scores on the IRI, 
the stronger the response in the aMCC and AI when observing the pain of others [6, 9]. Indeed, 
individuals who have difficulties identifying and describing their emotions (i.e., alexithymia) 
show attenuated activation during introspection and while empathizing with others [63, 64]. 
Therefore, it is very important to relate empathic traits in research participants to research find-
ings. However, self-report measures can be problematic if participants have poor introspec-
tion and cannot accurately report on their empathic skills thus resulting in inaccurate data. 
Alexithymia is prevalent in approximately 10% of the general population [65] and is more com-
mon in some socially afflicted disorders such as ASD [66, 67]. Since individuals can vary in their 
ability to perceive emotion, it should be included as a factor when conducting empathy research, 
especially when studying social disorders where alexithymia is more prevalent. Understanding 
the differences between deficits in empathy and deficits in introspection is an important dis-
tinction. For example, the long history of research suggesting that individuals with ASD have 
deficits in empathy has recently been disputed by research investigating alexithymia in ASD. A 
recent study found that deficits in empathy were related to alexithymia and not ASD severity 
by comparing individuals with ASD with and without Alexithymia and a typical control group 
[66]. In this study, ASD individuals without alexithymia did not differ in empathy from the 
control group. Since ToM deficits are consistently reported in ASD, authors of the study sug-
gest that empathy and ToM are dissociable and are part of different streams of social cognition.
On a similar note, experience and other cultural or biological biases should also be taken 
into consideration when reviewing empathy literature. Surprisingly, not all studies report 
on potential gender differences. While a few studies have reported no significant differences 
between males and females [8, 68], Singer et al. [10] found in men, but not in women, empathic 
responses are shaped by the evaluation of other people’s social behavior, such as participating 
in fair game play [10]. Gender may potentially be a major factor for some empathy network 
activation and not others. Relatedly, other biological factors may account for aberrant find-
ings. Oxytocin is a neuropeptide that has been shown to increase social understanding and 
emotion recognition [69] and may also play an important role in modulating empathy. One 
large study found that oxytocin receptors were associated with affective empathy, while a 
second receptor (arginine vasopressin receptor) contributed to cognitive empathy, as mea-
sured by the IRI [70]. Genetic variation in oxytocin as well as other receptors may influence 
empathy-related network activity [71]; therefore, future studies should examine how gender 
as well as hormones and gene variation modulate empathy.
In addition to individual differences, it is also crucial to note that methodological variation 
across neuroimaging studies can influence findings. Functional MRI data processing tech-
niques and analysis may affect the robustness, and in some cases, the location of a significant 
result. For instance, recent studies have found that different segments of the AI respond to 
various empathic situations [8]. Findings like these require data to be explored with high 
spatial resolution and thus could be missed or misattributed if the data are preprocessing in 
such a way that these anatomical boundaries are blurred (i.e., the result of spatial smoothing). 
Taken together, it is important to consider empathy research in the context of its participants, 
paradigm, and data analysis before interpreting results.




Social neuroscience has rapidly progressed in its understanding of shared representations in the 
brain since the discovery of mirror neurons. There is little doubt that research on shared networks 
has been integral to understanding and mapping empathy in the brain; nevertheless, questions 
remain regarding how empathy is elicited from the myriad social and contextual situations that 
generate it. The most current research literature indicates that the human brain engages multiple 
networks when sharing emotions and perspectives of others. Moreover, these networks vary in 
activation based on individual differences that make each person unique. As scientists continue to 
study the many connections between what is perceived and what is felt, it will expand previous 
models of empathy from a single network engagement to more tailored context-specific network 
activation. This chapter has discussed how core and complementary systems that respond to self 
and others play a significant role in our ability to empathize. As future work continues to map 
empathy in the brain and ultimately improve our understanding of social cognition, we will take 
one step closer to understanding what makes us uniquely human.
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